Treatise: What is 'Dukkha' and do the Arahants have it?

**What is 'Dukkha' and do the Arahants have it?**

There is a surprising controversy around this term 'Dukkha', usually translated as 'suffering'.

Many people believe that one's attachment or clinging to the aggregates is what constitutes dukkha in the early texts rather than the aggregates themselves being dukkha.

I will show that this is wrong.

Let's look at some texts

> There is no dukkha like the aggregates and no bliss higher than the peace.

> Hunger is the worst disease, conditioned things the worst dukkha. - Dhp 197-198

> "These three, bhikkhus (monks), are suffering. What are these three?

> The suffering of pain (dukkhadukkhatā), the suffering of formations (saṅkhāradukkhatā), and the suffering of change (vipariṇāmadukkhatā)— For the direct knowledge, full understanding, exhaustion, and abandonment of these three kinds of suffering, bhikkhus, … the noble eightfold path is to be developed." - sn45.165

Here it's important to understand that sankhāradukkhatā is a compound noun, meaning 'the dukkha that is all formations/synthesis'

This is echoed here;

> I have spoken of these three feelings. Pleasant, painful, and neutral feeling. These are the three feelings I have spoken of.

> But I have also said: ‘Suffering includes whatever is felt.’ 

> When I said this I was referring to the impermanence of conditions, to the fact that conditions are liable to end, vanish, fade away, cease, and perish. https://suttacentral.net/sn36.11/en/sujato?lang=en&layout=plain&reference=none&notes=asterisk&highlight=false&script=latin

This is as explicit as can be. Furthermore the whole sankharānirodha doctrine hinges on the fact that existence or the aggregates themselves are a problem.

The discussion should stop here but people are straight gaslighting themselves into reinterpreting this.

Why is this happening? It is because people desperately want existence to be redeemable. They are psychologically incapable of accepting that the Buddha did not approve of existence in any form and that there is no safety in it.

> Monks, just as even a tiny amount of feces is foul-smelling, in the same way, I don’t praise even a tiny amount of existence [bhava] —even as much as a finger-snap.” - AN 1:329

What evidence do they use to support their positions? There is nothing substantial but let's nevertheless refute it all

This is their crown jewel

> "Now this, monks, is the noble truth of dukkha: Birth is dukkha, aging is dukkha, death is dukkha; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are dukkha; association with the unbeloved is dukkha, separation from the loved is dukkha, not getting what is wanted is dukkha. In short, **Pañc'upādānakkhandhā are dukkha**. - SN56.11

They translate and interpret the highlighted part as:

*"The clinging to the five aggregates is suffering."*

This is wrong for two main reasons:

1. Upādāna here is not functioning as a verb ("clinging to"). Pañc'upādānakkhandhā (pañca + upādānakkhandhā) is a single compound noun, meaning "the five aggregates which are clung to." Normally translated as 'the five clung-to aggregates'. This is akin to the compound noun "the four satipatthana" which means 'the four foundations/establishments of mindfulness' rather than 'being mindful of the four foundations.

2. If the Buddha meant "clinging to the five aggregates is suffering," he would have said something like: 'upādānaṃ pañcakhandhesu dukkhaṃ' ("clinging to the five aggregates is suffering")

This all they can muster for textual reference and it is refuted by basic Pali reading skills.

Now let's move on to their inferred statements like "Arahants don't have dukkha because they don't have attachment".

One counters it like this, paraphrasing SN5.10 and SN44.2, to keep it short;

What now do you assume "an Arahant" to be? Are the aggregates an Arahant, is he in or apart from the aggregates? Can you actually pin the Arahant down as something true & real, or have you simply grasped a view? Just as, with an assemblage of parts, the word "chariot" is used, so too, when the aggregates are present, there’s the convention 'an Arahant'. But in reality, it’s only dukkha that arises, dukkha that stands, and dukkha that falls away. Nothing but dukkha comes to be, nothing but dukkha ceases.

I will try to explain the doctrine as simply as I can

1. What's the point of Buddhism as presented in the early texts? The ending of rebirth, as in ending 'subjective existence' as we know it.

2. Why would one want to end existence? Because it is asserted to be a "suffering" and it's ending is a type of previously undiscovered bliss.

3. What is 'attachment' or 'clinging'? It Is the cause of taking birth, the longing for existence.

4. Is 'attachment' the same thing as existence or is it something apart from existence? It is neither the same thing as existence nor is it something apart from existence. Rather it is the attachment that there is, in as far as there is attachment. 

Suppose we take the life of a person who became an Arahant, look at it as a process from birth to death, that's an aggregate of his experience. There is clinging therein up until the point of attaining arahantship, so we can delineate two subsets of existence here, with and without clinging, however the entire aggregate is dukkha.

5. What are the aggregates? Form, Consciousness, Feeling, Perception, Synthesis - these are the aggregates. Subjective existence is spoken of in that way.

6. Why do you call them aggregates? Because it is the collective of what 'was', of what 'is' and what 'will be'. The past, present and future states of existence are aggregated into a whole.

7. How can cessation of existence be pleasant? We don't call pleasure only the feeling of pleasure, in whatever terms and however pleasure is discerned we call it pleasure. The cessation of subjective reality is another truth & reality (not subjective & unsynthesized).

8. Is this verifiable? Yes, a person can realize the cessation of perception & feeling by direct experience. 

9. How is cessation possible? It is possible because there is an Unmade truth & reality. If subjective existence was the only truth & reality then escape from the feeling states would not be evident.

10. What distinguishes Buddhism from other meditative traditions? This very attainment of cessation, as a cessation of perception & feeling is what differentiates Buddhism from other meditative traditions.

11. What removes attachment? The direct realization of cessation is what removes attachment in a definitive sense.

12. What is Nibbāna? 

> “This, bhikkhu, is a designation for the element of Nibbāna: the removal of lust, the removal of hatred, the removal of delusion. The destruction of the taints is spoken of in that way.” https://suttacentral.net/sn45.7/en/bodhi?lang=en&reference=none&highlight=false

Arahants directly realize the cessation of dukkha (in every sense of the word) when attaining cessation of perception and feeling, their entering into that attainment entails a cessation of saṅkhāradukkhatā. They thus directly know the Unmade, the sorrowless, as an escape from subjective existence/feeling states, this seeing with wisdom is what removes their taints.

Their emerging from that attainment is an arising of more saṅkhāradukkhatā. 

This how ariyā see that only dukkha arises and only dukkha ceases.

They have also eliminated all the causes for the arising of dukkha that is associated with consequent lives, when their lifespan ends that's a complete exhaustion of their kamma, they know there will be no sequel, no more saṅkhāradukkhatā.

Having thus eliminated all the taints, undone the next birth, they also do not experience the range of negative emotions associated with the present life, but the sankhāradukkhatā that is remnant for them, their remnant existence, no matter the equanimity, is still saṅkhāradukkhatā.

I can give an analogy

Imagine a person is dreaming, living out countless lifespans in the dream-world, and being unable to wake up due to lack of understanding & concentration. He then trains those faculties in the dream and actually wakes up, but this is not a regular dream, there is a twist - he falls back asleep and has to live out his lifespan in the dream before the dreaming is fully exhausted because of past determinations. He would consequently be fully lucid in the dream and having perfected his faculties he would know there will be no sequel and this Is his final dream.

Here the dream itself represents saṅkhāradukkhatā/subjective existence, the waking up represents the cessation of saṅkhāradukkhatā, the being awake represents the Unmade, and the exhausting of the lifespan represents parinibbana (final extinguishment; the end of saṅkhāradukkhatā).

The whole discussion about whether an Arahant suffers is then akin to asking whether the fully lucid dreamer is still suffering. 

Those who don't understand that all dreaming is here defined as dukkha, rather than only the pain experienced in the dream, they would say that 'The fully lucid dreamer has no dukkha'. 

Whereas those who understand that all dreaming Is dukkha will be able to differentiate between the pain experienced in the dream as one dukkha and the dream itself as another dukkha.

I hope this simplifies things a little and that he point is clear: an Arahant is not without the aggregates, and the aggregates are dukkha.

The difference? They don’t delude themselves about it. The aggregates arise and cease - and what else could it be but dukkha.

**The "Clinging to Aggregates" Misstep: A Category Error in understanding the Four Noble Truths**

This “clinging to the five aggregates Is dukkha” view is a straight category error fallacy. When you dig into SN 56.11 (the Buddha’s first sermon). The Four Noble Truths have clear tasks:  

1. Dukkha – to be understood. 

2. Its cause (craving) – to be abandoned.  

3. Its cessation – to be directly experienced.  

4. The path – to be developed.

Asserting that dukkha is just clinging— this doesn’t hold up.

If dukkha were just clinging, the first noble truth—dukkha itself—would need to be abandoned, because abandoning clinging would end dukkha. But the sutta says dukkha is to be understood, not abandoned. Abandonment is for the second truth—craving (taṇhā), the thing that "makes for further existence." 

This is the category error: they’re conflating dukkha (the aggregates which are clung to ) with its cause (craving). If dukkha were only clinging, the tasks get jumbled—comprehending dukkha would mean abandoning it, which collapses the first and second truths into a mess. But the Buddha keeps them distinct: dukkha is the aggregates’ nature (impermanent, unsatisfactory, not-self), to be seen clearly, while craving is the fuel that keeps them rolling into new births, to be dropped.

Here’s the kicker: the long formulation of the first truth—*"Birth is dukkha, aging is dukkha, death is dukkha; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are dukkha; association with the unbeloved is dukkha, separation from the loved is dukkha, not getting what is wanted is dukkha."*

—**doesn’t mention clinging (upādāna) at all**. It’s just raw existence, no attitude required. Clinging only pops up in the shorthand (pañc’upādānakkhandhā), which is a compound noun. So dukkha isn’t framed as clinging itself—it’s the aggregates, cling or not.

The Arahants? They’ve abandoned craving—the cause of the next birth—but they haven’t abandoned aging or death to be still experienced. They still age and bodies break down; that’s saṅkhāra-dukkhatā, the dukkha of conditioned existence, existstent till parinibbāna.

The "clinging-only" take seems like a comfort grab—making existence fixable if you just shift your mindset. But the sutta doesn’t play that game. Dukkha is birth, aging, death—the aggregates themselves—to be seen clearly, not wished away. Arahants get this, living with it lucidly till the end. The error’s in jamming craving’s role into dukkha’s definition, ignoring the first truth’s plain terms. 

So the first truth’s dukkha isn’t about clinging—it’s the aggregates’ which are clung to by one who has come to train. Telling us to understand that, not ditch it, fits the text perfectly.

**Decapitating the Snake; The Killshot**

> Venerable sir, is that clinging the same as these five aggregates subject to clinging, or is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates subject to clinging?”

> “Bhikkhus, that clinging is neither the same as these five aggregates subject to clinging, nor is the clinging something apart from the five aggregates subject to clinging. But rather, the desire and lust for them, that is the clinging there. - SN22.82

Thus, dukkha — defined as pañc’upādānakkhandhā in SN 56.11— refers to the aggregates’ themselves, not mere clinging.

 

The snake is dead — dukkha is the aggregates – everything else is worthless!