Q/A

Here I explain the foundational philosophy of physics and that of language.

Question 1;

In science, do immaterial or/and nonphysical things exist? Is thought non-physical and/or immaterial? Is science(math, physics etc.) non-physical and/or immaterial?

Answer 1; 

We think in these terms about things like the electromagnetic spectrum, eg particle accelerators where acceleration of the wave demonstrably requires thinking along these lines - immaterially about the material or materially about the immaterial.

We are essentially using both physical and non-physical frameworks to predict and understand observed experiments/experience.

Other than this, no, because the philosophy of modern physics, understood through the lens of modern epistemology, can't allow positing an existence of anything as divorced from the coming into play of subjective observation/existence.

Thus, when we interpret experiments, we are fundamentally interpreting the workings of our own perceptions and nothing else.

To make accurate predictions about what we will observe, we use immaterial, conceptual mathematics, wavefunctions, information theory, etc. - but these are not "things" in themselves. They are model frameworks that aid us understand and anticipate our experience/experiment.

Thus, while modern physics does not posit the independent existence of purely material or immaterial entities, it necessarily relies on immaterial and material reasoning to make sense of our percipience.

Question 2;

What are words? To what extent can we explain words with words?

Answer 2:

In as far as words are evident - in that they are perceptible to the senses (spoken or written), they are then per definition perceived & conceived.

Words that were heard, thought or spoken, in the past, the term was applies to them, not the term is or will be. And these are  essentially experiences.

Therefore if we stick to analysis of that, rather than speculative conjecture, in talking about evident words we are talking about the synthesis of subjective existence.

Thus we are analyzing existence at this point, in particular a sub category of existence-synthesis which can be called "verbal synthesis".

Other types of synthesis would be non verbal feelings & perceptions.

In this analysis, all synthesis of reality is that of subjective existence, and so 'words, whatever they are - are essentially a part of that synthesis, conventions used when feelings & perceptions are in play.

In the tradition of analysis, a statement is analytical only if it is true by definition, eg. 'A triangle has three angles'. And so what exists per definition is existence and only this subjective existence is evident. In as far as analysis is concerned, only this can be analysed, because there is no sign of anything else. 

Thus we can explain our existence as something changing as it persists and as signs coming into play, in this framework the sign of a word, a sign of a painful feeling, or a sign of a blue colour, these are all categories of percipience.

Essentially, in this framework, information is all that is formed as the aggregate of synthesis, and only this subjective existence is being described.

Question 3:

Does the Buddha teach that there is no self?

Answer 3:

Whenever asked about whether there is a self or not, the Buddhas never give a categorical answer because it is a question that is to be answered by counter questioning

> if a person, when asked a question, gives a categorical answer to a question deserving a categorical answer, gives an analytical answer to a question deserving an analytical answer, gives a counter-question to a question deserving a counter-question, and puts aside a question deserving to be put aside, then — that being the case — he is a person fit to talk with. [Kathavatthu sutta][4]

Here is how the counter questioning goes

> "What do you think, Anuradha: Is form constant or inconstant?"

> "Inconstant, lord."

> "And is that which is inconstant easeful or suffering?"

> "Suffering, lord."

> "And is it proper to regard what is inconstant, suffering, subject to

> change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?"

> "No, lord."

> "Is feeling constant or inconstant?"

> "Inconstant, lord."...

> "Is perception constant or inconstant?"

> "Inconstant, lord."...

> "Are fabrications constant or inconstant?"

> "Inconstant, lord."...

> "Is consciousness constant or inconstant?

> "Inconstant, lord."

> "And is that which is inconstant easeful or suffering?"

> "Suffering, lord."

> "And is it proper to regard what is inconstant, suffering, subject to

> change as: 'This is mine. This is my self. This is what I am'?"

>"No, venerable sir."

> “What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form as the

> Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard feeling … perception …volitional formations … consciousness as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

> “What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as inf orm?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as apart from form?”—“No, venerable sir.”—“Do you regard the Tathagata as in feeling? As apart from feeling? As in perception? As apart from perception? As in volitional formations? As apart from volitionalf ormations? As in consciousness? As apart from consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

> “What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard form, feeling, perception, volitional formations, and consciousness taken together as the Tathagata?”—“No, venerable sir.”

> “What do you think, Anuradha, do you regard the Tathagata as one who is without form, without feeling, without perception, without volitional formations, without consciousness?”—“No, venerable sir.”

> “But, Anuradha, when the Tathagata is not apprehended by you as real and actual here in this very life, is it fitting for you to declare:

> ‘Friends, when a Tathagata is describing a Tathagata—the highest type of person, the supreme person, the attainer of the supreme attainment—he describes him apart from these four cases: ‘The

> Tathagata exists after death,’ or … ‘The Tathagata neither exists nor does not exist after death’?”

> “No, venerable sir.”

> “Good, good, Anuradha! Formerly, Anuradha, and also now, I make known just suffering and the cessation of suffering.” [Anuradha sutta][5]

Here another explanation

> Why now do you assume 'a being'?

Mara, have you grasped a view?

This is a heap of sheer constructions:

Here no being is found.

> Just as, with an assemblage of parts, The word 'chariot' is used, So, when the aggregates are present, There's the convention 'a being.'

> It's only suffering that comes to be, Suffering that stands and falls away. Nothing but suffering comes to be, Nothing but suffering ceases [Vajira sutta][1]

Essentially we want to train thus

> Herein, Bahiya, you should train yourself thus: 'In the seen will be merely what is seen; in the heard will be merely what is heard; in the sensed will be merely what is sensed; in the cognized will be merely what is cognized.' In this way you should train yourself, Bahiya.

> "When, Bahiya, for you in the seen is merely what is seen... in the cognized is merely what is cognized, then, Bahiya, you will not be 'with that.' When, Bahiya, you are not 'with that,' then, Bahiya, you will not be 'in that.' When, Bahiya, you are not 'in that,' then, Bahiya, you will be neither here nor beyond nor in between the two. Just this is the end of suffering." Ud1.10